Peter Welzel

Oligopoly and Exchange Rates


A simple linear model with product differentiation is used to examine the effects of deterministic and stochastic changes of the exchange rate on an international duopoly or oligopoly under both quantity and price competition. Results concerning exchange rate pass-through, the effects of exchange rate uncertainty, and the incentives for non-strategic real or financial hedging are found to be independent of the kind of oligopolistic interaction. If hedging is used as a strategic device either by the exporting firm or by its government, the type of oligopolistic interaction matters, creating an incentive for over-hedging under quantity competition and an incentive for under-hedging under price competition. In the appendix it is shown how the results can be extended to a more general framework.

Key words: oligopoly, exchange rate, uncertainty, pass-through

JEL classification: F12, F31, L13

* Paper presented at the 1997 meeting of the „Ausschuß für Außenwirtschaftstheorie und -politik“ in the „Verein für Socialpolitik“. I am indebted to the participants of the conference, in particular to Udo Broll, Bernhard Eckwert and Wilhelm Kohler, for comments and suggestions.

Contact:

Dr. habil. Peter Welzel, wiwi-Fakultät, Universität Augsburg, Universitätsstraße 16, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany, Phone +49-821-598-4186,
Fax +49-821-598-4230, e-mail: Peter Welzel
Juergen Peters,23.07.1997