In German law there are three rules of liability: liability for negligence („Verschuldenshaftung"), strict liability („Gefährdungshaftung") and liability as compensation for a legally-imposed, but extraordinary financial sacrifice („Aufopferungshaftung"). In an explicit or implicit way, these rules assign and distribute rights of usufruct, which can also be applied to the use of environmental mediums. This way, legal liability gets important for environmental policy. Against the background of the Coase theorem it can be determined how liability rules affect the activities of economically rational addressees. The analysis of these effects is the basis for evaluating environmental policy using the criterions of economic efficiency and ecological effectiveness for different ideals of envirommental policy. Analyzing and evaluating the effects of liability rules leads to the result that all rules principally induce static and dynamic efficiency. Only the negligence rule and the liability for sacrifice can be inefficient, but none the less effective, if liability increases discontinuously and an ecologically effective level of due care is judicially set between a critical and the pareto-efficient level of care. In all other cases a criterion of effectiveness that is stronger than the criterion of efficiency is either broken or the dynamic efficiency makes only a residual contribution to ensure effectiveness.
Dr. Ekkehard von Knorring, wiwi-Fakultät, Universität Augsburg,
Universitätsstraße 16, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany, Phone +49-821-598-4189,
Fax +49-821-598-4231, E-Mail: Ekkehard
von Knorring